Renewal Rights in Copyright by Brown, Sidney J.
Cornell Law Review
Volume 28
Issue 4 June 1943 Article 7
Renewal Rights in Copyright
Sidney J. Brown
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sidney J. Brown, Renewal Rights in Copyright, 28 Cornell L. Rev. 460 (1943)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol28/iss4/7
RENEWAL RIGHTS IN COPYRIGHT
SIDNEY J. BROWN
"...it continues to be the ingratitude of mankind, that they who teach
wisdom by the surest means, shall generally live poor and unregarded, as
if they were born only for the public, and had no interest in their omn.
well-being, but were to be lighted up like tapers, and waste themselves
for the benefit of others."-DRYDEN.
I. INTRODUCTION
The duration of copyright has long perplexed our legal masters. In an
attempt to compromise the claims of the authors, booksellers, and the public,'
our legislators finally devised a twenty-eight year term for the legal owner
and an additional term of twenty-eight years for the author or his family
in an order enumerated in the statute.
2
It is with the latter period and its beneficiaries that this paper will concern
itself. Its evolution will shed much light on a subject which has been made
confusing because of a faulty evaluation of early cases and predecessor
statutes.
'For an excellent and short historical review of the struggles of early English Par-
liament with the copyright terms and the various proposals before the House of Com-
mons seeking to protect the author, see LOWNDES, HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE LAW OF
COPYRIGHT (1840).2Copyright Act of 1909, 35 STAT. 1080 (1909), 17 U. S. C. § 23 (1940). It will be
profitable at this point to set out Section 23 of the Act in full since it will be referred
to continuously throughout the article.
§ 23. Duration; renewal and extension. The copyright secured by this title shall
endure for twenty-eight years from the date of first publication, whether the copy-
righted work bears the author's true name or is published anonymously or under
an assumed name: Provided, That in the case of any posthumous work or of any
periodical, cyclopedic, or other composite work upon which the copyright was
originally secured by the proprietor thereof, or of any work copyrighted by a
corporate body (otherwise than as assignee or licensee of the individual author)
or by an employer for whom such work is made for hire, the proprietor of such
copyright shall be entitled to a renewal and extension of the copyright in such
work for the further term of twenty-eight years when application for such renewal
and extension shall have been made to the copyright office and duly registered
therein within one year prior to the expiration of the original term of copyright;
And provided further, That in the case of any other copyrighted work, including
a contribution by an individual author to a periodical or to a cyclopedic or other
composite work, the author of such work, if still living, or the widow, widower,
or children of the author, if the author be not living, or if such author, widow,
widower, or children be not living, then the author's executors, or in the absence
of a will, his next of kin shall be entitled to a renewal and extension of the
copyright in such work for a further term of twenty-eight years when application
for such renewal and extension shall have been made to the copyright office and
duly registered therein within one year prior to the expiration of the original
term of copyright: And provided further, That in default of the registration of
such application for renewal and extension, the copyright in any "worli shall
determine at the expiration of twenty-eight years from first publication.
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II. HISTORICAL
The two term copyright originated with the Statute of Anne3 which limited
the term of copyright to fourteen years, and provided that after the expira-
tion of this term the "sole right of printing or disposing of copies shall return
to the authors thereof, if they are then living, for another term of 14 years."14
This statute formed the basis for the colonial copyright acts' out of which
developed the term adopted by the first Congress in 1790.6 The Copyright
Act of 1790 departed in only one essential particular from the Statute of
Anne in that it gave the second term to the "author, or authors . . . or their
executors, administrators, or assigns. . . . " Except for the addition of the
author's family and the extension of the terms of both the original8 and the
renewal9 rights, the law and theory as to renewal rights have remained the
same.
The English statutes, on the contrary, have shown marked changes. The
Statute of 54 Geo. III in 1814 increased the first term to twenty-eight years
and substituted a renewal term which was to endure for the life of the author,
provided he was alive at the expiration of the first term.
In 1842 the renewal period was abolished and a term of life plus seven
years of forty-two years straight, whichever was longer, was adopted. 10
The present English statute, passed in 1911, granted a term of life plus
fifty years, the last twenty-five years of which are specifically made unassign-
able during the life of the author."
38 ANNE, c. 19 (1710).
aThe case of Donaldson v. Beckett, 4 Burr. 2408, 1 Eng. Rep. R. 837 (K. B. 1774)
finally settled the dispute as to the existence of a perpetual copyright against such
perpetual right.
5In 1783 the Colonial Congress passed a resolution recommending to the several
states that they secure to the authors and publishers, their executors, administrators,
and assigns the copyright of books for a term of fourteen years and a second term of
fourteen years if they survive7 the first. Pursuant to this resolution, twelve of the
thirteen states passed copyright statutes. Of these, seven contained a fourteen year term
with a renewal term of fourteen years. Five of the states created straight terms, the
shortest being fourteen years and the longest twenty-one. SOLBERG, COPYRIGHT ENACT-
MENTS (1906).
61 STAT. 124 (1790).
7Id. § 1.8The Copyright Act of 1831, 4 STAT. 436 (1831), increased the first term to twenty-
eight years and saved the second term for the widow or children of the author in case
the author should not be living at the expiration of the first term.
OThe 1909 Act added fourteen years to the renewal term and extended the right
to renew to the executor and to the next of kin. That Act also permitted renewal by
proprietors of works specifically enumerated therein. See note 2 .rupra.
305 & 6 Vicv., c. 45 (1842). For an interesting discussion of the developments
leading up to the passage of this Act and the struggle of Sergeant Talfourd on behalf
of the authors to retain an inalienable renewal term which he had introduced in his
"Bill," see LOwNDES, HISTORICAL SKETCH OF COPYRIGHT (1840) 84 et seq.
"1Copyright Act, 1911, 1 & 2 GEO. V, c. 46, § 5 (2) provides:
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The Canadian statute is more like the American Copyright Act except
that the renewal term is limited to fourteen years and to the author's widow
and children, if the author be not living. A second registration is required
to be made within one year after the expiration of the first term.12
III. RIGHTS OF THE ASSIGNEE
In reviewing the rases interpreting these statutes and determining the
proper application, of the present statute, it is of the utmost importance to
carefully examine the particular statute giving rise to the claim, the charac-
ter of the claimant, the basis of the claim, and the nature and extent of the
interest claimed.
The alienability of the renewal term and the effect of attempted alienation
on the. author and the others enumerated in the Copyright Act has been the
subject of much controversy. 13
The intent to protect the author, encourage learning, and thereby promote
science and industry, is sufficiently indicated in the famous case of Donaldson
v. Beckett' 4 where the court in denying the existence of a perpetual copy-
right said, "In. the case of a perpetual privilege and monopoly, the bookseller
becomes the author's leave-giver; . . . But should the work pursuant to the
Statute of Queen Anne, revert to the author in 14 years, he will become the
guardian of his own fame, and in consequence, learned and industrious men
will be enabled to reap not only fame, but the profits of their labours, to
the honor and advantage of themselves and their families."
Despite the court's opinion as to the effect of the statute, it soon developed
that the author could be deprived of this additional term if he saw fit to
assign it away. In the case of Carnan v. Bowles,'5 relying on the unreported
"... Where the author of a work is the first owner of the copyright therein,
no assignment of the copyright, and no grant of interest therein, made by him
(otherwise than by will) after the passing of this Act, shall be operative to vest
in the assignee or grantee any rights with respect to the copyright in the work
beyond the expiration of 25 years from the death of the author, and the re-
versionary interest in the copyright expectant on the termination of that period
shall, on the death of the author, notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary,
devolve on his (legal representative) as part of his estate, and any agreement
entered into by him as to the disposition of such reversionary interest shall be
null and void but nothing in this proviso shall be construed as applying to the
assignment of copyright in a collective work or a license to publish a work or
part of a work as part of a collective work."
12 Copyright Act R. S., c. 62 et seq., 2 REV. STAT. OF CAN. c. 70, § 19.
13As early as 1774, the English court indicated its doubt as to the ownership of
the renewal term in case of an assignment when it said, "If the book at the end of
14 years reverts to the author, his interest is saved; if it does not, the legislature, by
such a construction, has extended no benefit to learned men." Donaldson v. Beckett,
4 Burr. 2408, 1 Eng. Rep. R. 837 (K. B. 1774).
'4Ib1.
152 Bro. C. C. 80, 29 Eng. Rep. R. 45 (Ch. 1786).
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case of Rennet v. Thompson, came the suggestion in reference to the author's
sale of "all his interest" in the copyright of a book of roads, that "It must,
I think, be considered as conveying his whole right. If he had meant to
convey his first term only, he should have said so."'16
In Rundell v. Murray,17 where the author of a cook book had made a gift
of it to a publisher, the court refused to restrain the publisher at the expira-
tion of fourteen years on the theory that the author was estopped from claim-
ing any right in the work.'8
The only issue in these English cases was the intention of the parties and
whether such intention had sufficiently manifested itself in the agreement
between them. 9 If the author survived the first term, the assignee auto-
matically became entitled to the second. No additional assignment was
necessary.
The early treatises on copyright law were all in accord with the view that
a general assignment carried with it the contingent interest in the second
term. There was no doubt, therefore, that under the Statute of Anne, the
renewal term was assignable.20
That such was undoubtedly the belief of the leaders in Parliament, witness
the efforts of men like Sergeant Talfourd2 ' and the Lord Macaulay 22 in seek-
ing further protection for the author and the subsequent abolition of the
renewal term in England.
The renewal clauses as contained in the American Copyright Acts of 1790
and 1831 received their first interpretation in this country in 1846 in the
celebrated case of Pierpont v. Fowle.2 8 This much cited case involved an
assignment by an author of a book copyrighted under the 1790 Act in terms,
"The copyright of said book." Prior to the expiration of the first fourteen
year term, the 1831 Act was passed which increased the first term in new
works to twenty-eight years, and similarly extended the term in subsisting
copyrights24 to the author if still living.2 5 It does not appear whether the
16It should be noted that this was not a direct holding by the court because the
claim that the first assignment did not carry the second term was abandoned by the
defendant who was a second assignee from the author and had received his assignment
after the expiration of the first term.
171 Jac. 311, 37 Eng. Rep. R. 868 (Ch. 1821).
181n this case, the court conceded the right to assign the contingent term if expressly
so indicated in the agreement.
19See also Brooke v. Clark, 1 B. & Ald. 396, 106 Eng. Rep. R. 146 (K. B. 1818).
2 0See CuRTis, THE LAW' OF COPYRIGHT (1847) 234; GODSON, A PRAcTIcAL TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR INVENTION AND COPYRIGHT (2d ed. 1851) 431.21See note 10 supra.22See Pamphlet, Speeches by Macaulay, Feb. 5, 1841, April 6, 1842.
232 Woodb. & M. 23, 19 Fed. Cas. 652 (C. C. D. Mass. 1846).
24Copyright Act of 1831, 4 STAT. 436, § 1 (1831).
251d. § 16.
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defendant assignee was claiming the renewal term under the 1790 Act or
the extended term under the 1831 Act. 26 In a lengthy and confused opinion
the court held that the assignee was entitled only to the first fourteen year
term .in view of the limited nature and extent of the assignment. The court
advanced various reasons for so holding but mixed up the rights of an
assignee under the 1790 Act in the renewal term with the rights of an
assignee to the extended term under the 1831 Act in subsisting works.27
Although the case has been cited by many authorities as holding that the
renewal term cannot be assigned, dicta in the case indicate quite the con-
trary. In citing Carnan v. Bowles2s as representative of the type of assign-
ment that will carry the renewal term, the court at least clearly indicated its
belief that the term is assignable, if not also that a general assignment show-
ing an intention to include the renewal term will pass it to the assignee.2 9
The court, however, requires proof of a clear intention that the contingent
term was assigned and that a fair consideration was paid for it.A0
The case of Paige v. Banks3l was the first Supreme Court expression on
the issue as to the right of an assignee to the renewal term. In that case a
court reporter contracted with a publisher to furnish him with the reports
and the publisher was to have the "copyright of said reports to them and
their heirs and assigns forever." The reporter was to receive $1,000 per
volume as each report was published. In refusing to enjoin the further
publication of the reports after the expiration of the first term of twenty-
eight years, the Court held that the agreement was intended to pass all the
interest of the author in the particular work and that the publisher became
26It would seem that in view of the express provision of the statute that only the
author should get the extended period, the defendant's claim must have been of the
renewal term under the 1790 Act which gave the renewal term to the assignee as well
as the author.27With respect to the renewal term under the 1790 Act, the court, it is submitted,
wrongly interpreted that Act when it said that the clause meant later assigns when it
spoke of the author and his assigns as being entitled to the renewal term. A later case,
Cowen v. Banks, 24 How. Pr. 72 (C. C. N. Y. 1862) is in accord with this case's
interpretation of the 1790 Statute. But cf. White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Goff, 187
Fed. 247 (C. C. A. 1st, 1911).2
sSupra note 15.29For a contrary opinion as to this latter point see CURTis, loc. cit. supra note 20.3OCf. Cowen v. Banks, 24 How. Pr. 72 (C. C. N. Y. 1862) where the court found
as a fact that the intent of the reporter of court opinions was to assign his entire
interest in a copyright under the 1790 Act, and therefore, the assignee was entitled as
against the plaintiff administrator of the author, to the extension under the 1831 Act
as well as the renewdl. It is submitted that the court erred in granting to the assignee
any interest in the extension of the 1831 Act since that Act specifically limited the
extension to the author, if living at the time of the passage of the Act, which was the
case here. It might, however, be justified on the theory that the author was estopped
to claim any interest in the work and any rights he obtained under the Act he held in
trust for the assignee.
3113 Wall. 608 (U. S. 1871).
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the absolute owner of it. The Court treated the entire transaction as a
matter of ordinary contract law. The case did not determine whether the
assignee was entitled to an exclusive right for twenty-eight more years. It
decided only that the author was estopped as against this publisher from
claiming an exclusive right. Actually it is not authority for anything beyond
that, although there is a dictum in the case in accord with Pierpont v. Fowle
to the effect that the intention of an author to assign his entire interest in a
copyrighted work will carry the renewal term.32
The conclusion to be drawn from these early cases is that it was considered
possible at that time for the author to assign the renewal term along with
the original term if he clearly so intended. And this was generally the
opinion of the legal writers commenting on the American and English cases. 33
Although the copyright statute was amended in 1870, 1891, and 1909, and
the legislators had before them the rather consistent line of cases recognizing
the assignability of the renewal term, with the exception of the few changes
already mentioned,34 they did not, as the English statute does,3 5 make the
renewal term inalienable. As a matter of fact, the committee which reported
the 1909 Act stated that it sought to frame that Act "as is the existing law,"
in opposition to suggestions that a term of life plus fifty years be substituted
for the two term system.36
The confusion in recent cases is caused by a lack of appreciation of what
the committee, and the Assistant Attorney General Fowler, in his opinion
on the assignability of the renewal right meant when they declared the right
to be unassignable.3 7 A distinction must be observed in speaking of renewal
right, renewal term, and renewal period. The renewal right is unassignable,
at least prior to the accrual of the twenty-eighth year. Since the statute
32The case of Paige v. Banks aroused the first real interest on the part of the text
writers in the subject of renewal rights. E. S. Drone, in his treatise, Law of Property
in Intellectual Productions, published in 1879, gave a very broad interpretation to the
case. In the first discussion of any appreciable length to be found so early among the
copyright authorities; Drone cites the Paige case as holding that the absolute sale of
a manuscript carries the renewal term, and also that not only the author, but his widow
and children, in case he does not survive, lose all right to the copyright and any possible
renewals. It is submitted that Drone goes too far, and that later cases and authorities
do not support his view, although he has been relied on by most authorities for their
views on the nature of the renewal term and the effect of outright sale. See also
MAcGLLIVRAY, LAW OF COPYRIGHT (1902) 270, and cf. BOWKER, COPYRIGHT, ITS
HISTORY AND ITS LAW (1912) 117.3 3DRONE, op. cit. supra note 32, at 326, 332; SCRUTTON, LAWS OF COPYRIGHT (1883);
MAcGILLIVRAY, LAW OF COPYRIGHT (1902); see JENNER, THE PUBLISHER AGAINST THE
PEOPLE (1907) (Pamphlet) who suggests a third term of fourteen years for the benefit
of the author and that it be made unassignable.3 4 See note 9 supra.3 5 See note 11 supra.
36H. R. REP. No. 2220, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. (1908).
3728 Op. ATT'y GEN. (1910) 162.
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specifically enumerates the individuals who may apply for the renewal, the
right to apply may not be assigned in such manner as to entitle the assignee
to apply for the renewal in his own name.38 The renewal term as we have
seen, may be assigned. The renewal period is the year prior to the expiration
date of the copyright and during which application for the renewal term
must be made.
Subsequent to Paige v. Banks, and after a lapse of forty years during
which the renewal term did not once come up for consideration by the
courts, the case of White-Smith Music Publishing Company v. Goff,39 was
decided. The court in that case, in accordance with the opinion of the
attorney general and the explicit provisions of the statute, denied the assignee
of a copyright the right to apply for the renewal term under Section 24 of
the statute.4"
There can be no quarrel with this rule since the statute is specific, but
both the Goff case and the attorney general indicated a recognition of the
equitable right of the assignee in this term if and when the author obtains it.
Subsequent cases rendered lip service to this principle although the point
was not directly involved.
41
Up to this point there had been very few cases involving the second term
because most copyrighted works were hardly profitable during the first term,
let alone during a renewal term. There was, therefore, very little interest
on the part of those who might be legally entitled to the renewal term, to
renew, or to contest the rights of those who had renewed. But the advent
of radio broadcasting and its search for material together with the new
medium of expression which it offered, and the constant rotation of enter-
tainment brought out of retirement many songs and books that had been
cast aside or forgotten. The potentiality of renewed popularity and new
financial rewards soon brought about protracted litigation as to the renewal
term since most of the works had been copyrighted, many years ago and
little interest had been displayed in proper application for the renewal term.
It'was not, however, until early in 1941 in Witmark & Sons v. Fisher
Music Ca.,42 that a court found itself face to face with the issue as to whether
38Ibid.
39187 Fed. 247 (C. C. A. 1st, 1911).40Section 24 extends the term of subsisting copyrights, giving 'the renewal right to
substantially the same persons as Section 23 (see note 2 supra) with certain exceptions
hereafter noted.41Silverman v. Sunrise Pictures Corp., 273 Fed. 909 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921); 290 Fed.
804 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923) ; Tobani v. Carl Fischer, 98 F. (2d) 57 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938),
cert. den. 305 U. S. 650, 59 Sup. Ct. 243 (1938).
4238 F. Supp. 72 (S. D. N. Y. 1941), aff'd, 125 F. (2d) 949 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942).
All references to the Witntark case are to the decision in the circuit court of appeals
unless otherwise indicated. The case was affirmed by the Supreme Court on April 5,
1943, and comment thereon has been inserted as note 56a infra.
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an assignee could enjoin the author or his subsequent assignee, from pub-
lishing after the expiration of the first term. In all prior cases, it will be
recalled, the author sought to enjoin his assignee from further publication
after the expiration of the first term and many of the courts had denied him
relief on equitable principles. In this case Ball, Olcott, and Graff composed
the song "When Irish Eyes Are Smiling," transferring all rights, including
renewals, to the publisher Witmark and Sons, plaintiff herein. During the
last year of the first term, plaintiff applied for the renewal in Graff's name
and on behalf of Olcott's widow and then assigned the copyrights so obtained
to itself. Graff also renewed and assigned the renewal to the defendant
publishing company. Witmark obtained an injunction against further publi-
cation by the defendant and this was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals.
This court in a very able opinion discussed earlier cases where the right to
assign the renewal term was unquestioned and noted the absence in the 1909
statute of any prohibition on assignment.
In a lengthy and stirring dissent,43 Judge Frank criticized the opinion
of the majority on several grounds. He said that since this was a court
of equity it should look into the adequacy of the consideration paid by
Witmark for the assignment and the difference in bargaining power be-
tween the author and the publisher. There is much merit in such an
argument but the ordinary principles of equity are quite as capable of
application here as in any other case coming within equity's general juris-
diction.44 Nor, are these principles entirely disregarded by the major-
ity.45 It is submitted, however, that as to the interpretation of cases and
authorities cited by Judge Frank, he has been unduly influenced by some
broad language, and a careless use of terms. Thus in Shapiro, Bernstein and
Company v. Bryan et al.,46 which involved employer and proprietor rights,
though the court spoke of a limitation on the author's right to assign, it
merely meant that he could not sign avay the term in such a manner as to
deprive his widow and children thereof if he died before the last year.
The minority placed much reliance on the report of the committee accom-
panying the bill which became the present Copyright Act.47 The committee
43125 F. (2d) 949, 954-969 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942).44The equitable principle suggested here by Judge Frank was in fact first enunciated
in this type of case in Pierpont v. Fowle (supra notes 23 and 30) where the court set
adequacy of consideration as an element to be considered in determining renewal rights.
45See 125 F. (2d) 949, 954, where the court said: "On this interlocutory issue we
ought not to foreclose other contentions which the parties may wish and be entitled to
raise on the merits, including possibly claims of inadequacy 9f consideration in 1917,
so gross as to prevent negative enforcement of the assignment.-
46123 F. (2d) 697 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941).
47Supra note 36.
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undoubtedly had in mind the interest of the author in phrasing the renewal
term. So had the committee in reporting the 1831 Act.48 And such has
been the intention of most of the copyright legislation in England and in
otheor countries. 49 But they have not been successful in protecting the author
against himself.50 The committee sought only to prevent an outright sale
from carrying the renewal.51 Such was the state of law as enunciated in
Pierpont v. Fowle52 and Paige v. Banks.53 It, however, did not seek to pre-
vent the author from specifically assigning the renewal term. This is evident
from the language used. The committee sought to frame the new law as
was the existing law so "that he [the author] could not be deprived of that
right" [to take the renewal term]. The existing law recognized the right
of the assignee, where the renewal term was assigned to him, to require the
author if he survived and applied for the renewal, to hold it in trust for his
benefit.54 If Congress had sought to prohibit wholly the assignment of this
renewal term prior to its accrual, it might have said so since it had before
it the interpretation of prior similar statutes by the courts.5 5 It might have,
for instance, enacted a provision similar to that found in the English statute
which specifically provides that any assignment of the last twenty-five years
is void.56 Congress can do likewise with respect to the renewal term. Until
it does so, it is unfair to expect the courts to legislate judicially such a
provision into execution.
Recent cases have carried into practice the opinion of the circuit court of
appeals in the Witmark case. 56' In Schirmer, Inc. v. Robbins Music Co.,57
48H. R. REP. No. 3, 2 1st Cong., 2d Sess. (1830).49See notes 10 and 22 supra.5Olbid.
5128 Op. ATrr'Y GEx. (1910) 162. That such had been the effect of prior legislation,
see also notes 32 supra.5 2Supra notes 23 and 30.
53Stpra notes 31 and 32.54Supra note 41. See also COPINGER, LAW OF COPYRIGHT (7th ed. 1936) ; it would be
vain to attempt to set out in repetition the eleven other authorities among the text
writers cited by Judge Clark speaking for the majority in the Witinark case, 125 F.
(2d) 949, 952 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942), notes 4, 5, and 6.55See notes 33-35.
56Supra note 11. See COPINGER, LAW OF COPYRIGHT (7th ed. 1936) 106, where that
eminent authority criticizes the ineffectiveness of this "curious proviso" in the English
act which permits an assignment of the last twenty-five years by the legal representative
of a deceased author, and permits its sale for his debts. Copinger also states that a
specific legatee will probably sell it outright and it is usually sold in winding up the
estate so that the publisher will get it anyway.
56'Subsequent to the completion of this article, the United States Supreme Court on
April 5, 1943 (- U. S. -, 63 Sup. Ct. 773), in a divided opinion, affirmed the deci-
sion of the majority in the Witmark case. The Court in a historical approach to the
problem saw before it only the question whether the Copyright Act nullified an assign-
ment by a copyright owner of the contingent renewal term. Under the facts of this
particular case it found, in accord with the writer's view, that prior to the enactment
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the New York Supreme Court granted specific performance of a contract
to convey the renewal term in a suit by the assignee against the author, who
had obtained the renewal and had assigned it to another. judge Wasservogel
correctly interpreted the law when he saw as the only question before the
court the enforcement of a contract involving a determination as to the in-
tention of the parties with respect to the renewal term.58
In Marks Music Corp. v. Vogel Music Corp.,5 the court in refusing sum-
mary judgment to an assignee of the renewal rights in a song, in view of the
claims of a prior assignee of all the author's "right, title and interest," deemed
it a triable issue as to whether the prior assignment had not as a matter
of fact carried the equitable right to the renewal term. This would seem to
be carrying the Witmark case to its furthest extreme. It is submitted that
as to the prior assignment the court should have found as a matter of law
that the renewal term did not pass. 0°
A rather unusual twist as to the effect of an assignment of the renewal
term is found in the recent case of Selwyn & Co. v. Veillr.61 There Veiller
assigned all his rights in a play he had written, including the renewal term,
to Selwyn, who in turn assigned to Loew's, Inc. Thereafter, Loew's desir-
ing to make a motion picture based on the play and seeking to assure itself
of complete protection, obtained an assignment from Veiller of any interest
he might have therein. Selwyn in this action sought to recover from Veiller
the consideration received by him from Loew's for the assignment on the
of the present statute the renewal term was assignable and that the 1909 amendment
did not change that law. The Court confirmed the holdings in earlier cases that an
assignment by the author of his "copyright" in general terms did not include conveyance
of his renewal interest (see supra notes 30-33), and that therefore in the absence of a
specific assignment of the renewal term the assignee will be entitled to the first term
only. Justice Frankfurter, -speaking for the majority, specifically refused to rule on the
question whether a court may deny enforcement of a particular assignment because
made under oppressive circumstances.
57176 Misc. 578, 28 N. Y. S. (2d) 699 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
58Accord, Paige v. Banks, supra note 31.
5942 F. Supp. 859-I (S. D. N. Y. 1942):
60 CURTIS, op. cit. supra note 20, at 234; LAW, COPYRIGHT AND PATENT LAW OF THE
U. S. (1870) 59 (contains forms for contracts to make a general assignment and also
forms that include a specific assignment and the renewal as well). SHAFTER, MUSICAL
COPYRIGHT (1st ed. 1932) (2d ed. 1939). If a mere assignment without any mention
of the renewal term can be considered as conveying the renewal, there would be nothing
left of the statute. In Paige v. Banks where the language used tends to support the
denial of summary judgment in the Marks case, the author was the plaintiff and exten-
sive evidence indicated an intention on his part to give up all interest in the reports
for the $1,000 per volume. In the Tobani case, ill-considered dicta which was apparently
taken from the Paige case also tends to support the defendant's claim in the Marks case.
The language of the committee, the attorney general, the general trend of authority
cited above and the more recent cases, such as the Witmark case, seem to indicate a
more rigid scrutiny of any agreement claiming to assign a renewal term. See also
crticism, note 32 supra.
6143 F. Supp. 491 (S. D. N. Y. 1942).
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theory that any rights that Veiller had belonged to it. In denying recovery,
the court held that if plaintiff received all of the author's rights under the
original assignment, then the defendant gave Loew's nothing belonging to
the plaintiff. And if plaintiff left the defendant with any rights, then the
defendant was entitled to the consideration he received for those rights. The
case illustrates the element of uncertainty that has been introduced into assign-
ment contracts, but such uncertainty is to be expected in view of the very
nature of the interest sought to be purchased. The assignee's right to the
renewal term depends on the author's surviving the twenty-seventh year.
Since that is uncertain, the purchaser must also get assignments from all
those who might be entitled on the author's death, so that if they are alive
they can be required to obtain the renewal and make the assignment. But
all the assignments in the world cannot protect the assignee if he should
leave out some distant relative or be unable to find one who can apply for
the renewal. Obtaining the renewal term is a highly speculative venture at its
best, so that those who seek it in avoidance of the intent of the statute to
give it to the author and his family, cannot complain too much about having
to pay tribute to so many people and having no complete assurance that they
will get the renewal term. 61' At best, the assignee is really protecting him-
self against suits for infringement, since the work will pass into the public
domain if not renewed by those entitled.6 2 But even that is not certain for,
as has been stated, a distant relative whose prior assignment was not obtained
might appear and sue for infringement.
IV. EFFECT OF ASSIG1MENT
Thus far we have been considering the assignability of the renewal term
and the rights of the assignee. The effect of the assignment on the others
mentioned in the statute as well as the rights of those specifically enumerated
therein, and the curious possibilities that might arise must still be considered.
Their rights will be examined in the order in which they are mentioned in
the statute.
It is worthy of note that the author's family has not always received the
benefit of the renewal term in the specific and express manner in which it
is now protected. The Statute of Anne merely returned the copyright to the
author, if still living at the expiration of the first term.6 3 The first Ameridan
copyright statute in 1790 gave the renewal term to the author, or authors,
614The Tobani v. Fischer cases are illustrative of a publisher's futile attempt to assure
himself of the renewal term. 98 F. (2d) 57 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938), and 263 App. Div.
503, 33 N. Y. S. (2d) 294 (2d Dep't 1942) ; see note 80 infra.62 Copyright Act of 1909, 35 STAT. 1080, 17 U. S. C. § 23 (1940) ; see note 2 supra.63 See notes 3 and 4 supra.
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"his or their executors, administrators and assigns."6 The 1831 Act added
the widow and children as those entitled to the renewal "copyright and dropped
executors, administrators, and assigns.6 5 The Copyright Act remained in
this form for almost a hundred years, until the committee reporting the
present act stated, "Instead of confining the right of renewal to the author,
if still living, or to the widow or children of the author, if he be dead, we
provide that the author of such work if still living, may apply for the re-
newal, or the widow, widower, or children of the author, if the author be
not living, or if such author, widow, widower or children be not living, then
the author's executor, or in the absence of a will, his next of kin." 6
A. The Authar
Many courts and text writers have indicated the possibility that an author
may deprive himself of all right in the renewal term by an assignment before
the accrual of the renewal period which purports to convey away all interest
in the copyright. Thus, although the words used may not be sufficient to
constitute an assignment of the exclusive right granted under the statute,
they may be effective to debar the author from claiming the renewal copy-
right. 7
Such apparently was the conclusion of the Court in Paige v. Banks,65
where the Court without deciding whether the defendant assignee got the
renewal term by the assignment from the author, refused to enjoin further
publication by the defendant, finding as a result that the author had lost
the right to the renewal term.
In the Goff case, the court, relying on Paige v. Banks, said by way of
dictum that aside from considerations of statute, the author can estop him-
self from claiming any further rights in a copyrighted work by virtue of
some act or agreement in relation thereto. There have been no recent cases
tirectly on this point although dicta in several are in conflict.69 The statute
64Supra note 7. See also note 27 supra.65Sutpra note 8.66H. R. REP. No. 2220, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. (1908) as enacted in Copyright Act of
1909, 35 STAT. 1080, 17 U. S. C. § 23 (1940).67Rundell v. Murray, 1 Jac. 311, 37 Eng. Rep. R. 868 (Ch. 1821) ; Cowan v. Banks,
24 How. Pr. 72 (C. C. N. Y. 1862); Paige v. Banks, 13 Wall. 608 (U. S. 1871);
White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Goff et al., 187 Fed. 247 (C. C. A. 1st, 1911); Tobani
v. Carl Fischer, 98 F. (2d) 57 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938) ; Marks Music Corp. v. Vogel
Music Corp., 42 F. Supp. 859-1 (S. D. N. Y. 1942) ; DRONE, op. cit. supra note 32, at
326; MAcGILLIVRAY, op. ct. sipra note 33, at 270; BOWKER, op. cit. supra note 32, at
117-118. Contra: Witmark & Sons v. Fred Fisher Music Co., 125 F. (2d) 949, 951(C. C. A. 2d, 1942) ; H. R. REP. No. 2220, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. (1908) ; 28 Op. Atr'y
GEN. (1910) 162; WElL, AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAw (1917) 366-367; SuAImER, op.
cit. supra note 60, at 176.6880 U. S. 608 (1871).,
69See note 67 spra and compare especially the I'Vitmark case and the Marks case.
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itself is silent as to any estoppel against the author's claiming rights after
such a conveyance, though it would seem that in view of the statute's express
terms that the author is to have the renewal right, he should not be deprived
of that right.
B. Widow, Widower, and Children
We have seen that the intent of the statute to benefit the author is carried
over to the author's family in the event that the author is not alive when
the time to make the renewal application arrives.7 0 Thus the second term
may be secured by the widow, widower, or children. The issue then is
whether the author by a prior assignment of the term, or sale of all his
interest in the renewal copyright, can deprive his widow and children of the
renewal should the author not survive the twenty-seventh year of the first
term.
In a dictum in the Tobani v. Fischer1 case, Judge Manton suggested that
the author could deprive his children of the renewal term by divesting him-
self of all interest in the work.72 Such a statement was unnecessary to the
decision in that case since the composer, Tobani, was not entitled to any
interest in the copyright ab initio because it was a work made for hire, and
thus the employer was entitled to the original as well as the renewal right
under the statute.73 The statute intends to give the renewal term to the family
of the author only where he himself had some interest in the original term.
So although Tobani's children had renewed, they were not entitled to the
renewal right since as to this copyright they were not mentioned in the
statute.
The Witmark case contains a dictum to the effect that an assignment
prior to the accrual of the renewal period could not cut off the rights of
those enumerated in the statute if the author died prior to or during the
last year of the old term without applying for the renewal. 74 This view has
logic on its side and is in accord with the clear intent of the statute. The
rights given to the widow and children are not dependent on the author's,
except insofar as he must have been entitled to the original term as the
7OSu pra notes 2, 8, and 9.
7198 F. (2d) 57 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
72The court in the Tobani case apparently was relying on a statement in DRONE, op.
cit. supra note 32, at 332. Drone is criticized in 28 Op. ATT'y GEN (1910) 162 where
Assistant Attorney General Fowler says, "When the application for renewal is pre-
sented to the Register of Copyrights, the only thing left for -his consideration is
whether the applicant is one of the persons designated in the statute."
7SCopyright Act of 1909. See note 2, upra.
74125 F. (2d) 949, 950 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942). Accord: Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v.
Bryan, 123 F. (2d) 697 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941) ; Fox Film Corp. v. Knowles, 261 U. S.
326, 43 Sup. Ct. 365 (1923).
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author in a technical and legal sense. The case of Silverman v. Sunrise
Pictures Corp.,75 quite adequately sums up the nature of the widow's and
children's rights' in the following manner: The purpose of the renewal
provision,
"is to giye to the persons enumerated in the order of their enumeration
a new right or estate, not growing legally out of the original copyright
property, but a new creation for the benefit (if the author be dead) of
those naturally dependent upon or properly expectant of the author's
bounty."
"The author cannot take away the right of the widow, children, etc.,
before the opening of the last year of the original copyright. It is not
until then that any estate or chose in action arises or exists; and when
such a right arises it is . . . a new estate, not a true extension of the
existing copyright."
Although the question has not been directly before the courts for deter-
mination, all the text writers, with a single exception, and the committee
which reported the present act, are unanimous in finding the widow's and
children's rights independent of the author's and not subject to his control
or disposition.76
Frohlich and Schwartz in their treatise77 suggest that if the author makes
an assignment during the last year of the first term and then dies, the as-
signee and not the persons enumerated in the statute would get the new
term. It is submitted that this would not be so unless the author or his
assignee in the author's name had already obtained the renewal at the time
of the assignment. The statute puts a premium on the application and if the
author had not applied, it would be impossible for the assignee to make the
application, he not being mentioned in the statute, any power of attorney
he may have expiring with the death of the author. The conditions precedent
to the rights of the author's family would then be present and they would
be entitled.
In the first edition of Shafter's work on musical copyright, that author fol-
lowed Drone and the dictum in the Tobani case in stating that the author's
contract of assignment would be enforceable even as against his family, if
he should not survive.78 In his 1939 edition, however, he discards this state-
ment and substitutes the other extreme saying that such an assignment would
75273 Fed. 909 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921), 290 Fed. 804 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923).
76 CURTIS, op. cit. supra note 20, at 235; WElL, op. cit. supra note 67, at 365, 366;
FROHLICH AND SCHWARTZ, LAW OF MOTION PICTURES AND THE THEAT (1918) 549;
DEWoLF, AN OUTLINE OF COPYRIGHT LAW (1925) 65; AMiDUR, COPYRIGHT LAW AND
PRACTICE (1936) 541; (1939) 10 AIR L. Rav. 198. Contra: DRONE, op. cit. supra note
32, at 332.77Supra note 76.7 8 SHAFTER, op. cit. supra note 60 (1st ed. 1932), at 138.
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not be enforceable against the widow even if she joined in the assignment.79
This latter would not seem to follow since she could be required by a court
of equity to apply for the renewal and make the conveyance to the assignee,
if she survived, in the same manner as the author.80
C. Executor: Dispasition by Will: Legatees
If neither the author nor his widow or children survive the first term, the
statute provides that the executor may make the ajplication for the renewal
term, and then it rather ambiguously states that "in the absence of a will,
his next of kin shall be entitled to a renewal .... "81
As has been previously noted, the executor is not a newcomer to this
family of persons entitled to apply for the renewal, since he was provided for
in the first Copyright Act8 2 though later dropped and. not revived until the
present act. This perhaps might account for the curious statement in the first
Silverman case83 to the effect that the executor had no rights in the renewal
unless the author survived the twenty-seventh year. Thereafter, the case of
Fox Film Corp. v. Knowles"4 went to the Supreme Court which reversed
the lower courts8 5 and held that the executor's right was independent of the
author's and existed solely in the creation of the statute, and that his right
to apply for renewal did not depend on the author's being alive in the last
year of the original term.
The right of the executor to apply for renewal in the absence of a widow
or children was carried to an illogical extreme in Yardley v. Houghton
Mifflin Ca.86 There an artist painted a picture for the New York City
79 SnrAFTER, op. cit. supra note 60 (2d ed. 1939), at 171.
8 0See Tobani v. Carl Fischer, 263 App. Div. 503, 33 N. Y. S. (2d) 294 (2d Dep't
1942). This case was an interesting aftermath of the 1938 Tobani case in the federal
court (see note 74 supra). It seems that when Fischer obtained Tobani's acknowledg-
ment of his employee status with regard to his work copyrighted by Fischer, the latter
also contracted to pay Tobani's wife $5,000 on Tobani's decease, and she assigned to
him all her rights in any renewal terms in said copyrights. Thereafter Mrs. Tobani
pre-deceased her husband and therefore was not entitled to any renewal rights. In this
suit by Tobani's children as administrator of Mrs. Tobani, they sought to recover the
$5,000 payable thirty days after Tobani's decease. The court in granting judgment for
the plaintiff recognized that Mrs. Tobani had an interest under the statute even prior
to the accrual of the renewal period that she might bind herself to convey if she ever
became entitled. Unless this is so, there was here no consideration for Fischer's promise.
It is submitted that the case is incorrectly decided anyway, since the federal court had
held that Tobani never had any interest in this copyright and therefore there was in
fact no consideration given by Mrs. Tobani in her covenant because she could never
become entitled to any renewal rights in a work made for hire.8 1 See not6 2 supra.82 Supra note 7.
83273 Fed. 909 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921).
84261 U. S. 326, 43 Sup. Ct. 365 (1923).
85275 Fed. 582 (S. D. N. Y. 1921), 274 Fed. 731 (E. D. N. Y. 1921), both aft'd,
279 Fed. 1018 (C. C., A. 2d, 1922).
86108 F. (2d) 28 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939), cert. den. 309 U. S. 686, 60 Sup. Ct. 891 (1940).
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Board of Education to be displayed in a high school, and copyrighted it in
his own name. He died prior to the renewal period and appointed one Class
his executor. The artist left surviving him two sisters as his only heirs and
next of kin, who applied for and obtained the renewal term. It appears that
the defendant infringed this copyright prior to the expiration of the first
term, though after the death of the artist, and was still using the picture at
the time of this suit. The executor had never applied for the renewal, though
prior to suit he had assigned all his rights to the sisters. In this suit against
the defendant by the sisters, the district court held that plaintiffs did not
obtain a valid renewal because the executor was entitled thereto.87 In the
circuit court, the claim as to a renewal was abandoned by the plaintiffs, and
they were permitted to recover for the infringements during the first term.
The court, however, held on a counterclaim that the plaintiffs renewal was
invalid. It would seem that such a holding was mere dictum, but it is never-
theless a significant disregard for the policy and intent of the statute. Cer-
tainly if the executor had renewed, he would have held the term in trust for
the next of kin.8 8 Also, since the next of kin are specifically mentioned in
the statute as entitled to renew, there can be no technical question of the
validity of the renewal especially in view of the fact that the policy that
motivates the courts in denying the right of the assignee to make the appli-
cation in his own name, is not present in the case of the author's own
family. When the statute says that in the absence of a will the next of kin
may renew, it obviously means where the will fails to make a beneficial
disposition of the renewal term. In the Yardley case,. it did not appear
whether any beneficial disposition was made. In any event, if the executor
refused to act, can it be denied that the next of kin would be entitled to
renew ?884
As has been seen, the statute provides that in the absence of a will, the
next of kin may renew. Whether this means that if there is a will and the
will names legatees they will be entitled to the renewal copyright or whether
it merely refers to the existence of an executor is not clear. A reference to
the committee report on the Copyright Act sheds some light on the question.
It says, "It was not the intention to permit the administrator to apply for
the renewal, but to permit the author who had no wife or children to be-
queath by will the right to apply for the renewal"8 9 Thus is indicated the
8725 F. Supp. 36 (S. D. N. Y. 1938).
8 8WEIL, op. cit. supra note 67, at 365; A.DUR, op. cit. supra note 76, at 545; SnXvraa,
op. cit. supra note 60, at 177 (suggests that the executor might be compelled to renew
for the benefit of a publisher-assignee).
88The Silverman case poses a similar question with respect to legatees.
89H. R. REP. No. 2220, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. (1908).
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purpose of the clause. Apparently then, the executor or the legatees9" may
apply, the former having been included as one who would best know the
nature and extent of his testator's property and could be relied on to make
the application at the proper time for the benefit of all those beneficially
entitled.
Despite the explanatory statement of the committee, the court in the
Silverman case stated that a disposition by will prior to the accrual of the
renewal period is ineffective to convey to the legatees the renewal right. 9'
If that is the proper interpretation of the statute, then it is submitted that
the clause has no meaning at all since the aid of the statute is not needed to
permit a disposition by will if the author survives the twenty-seventh year
and obtains the renewal. At that point it is property like any other and a
testator may dispose of it in any way he, sees fit.
The right of the next of kin to renew where the executor has been dis-
charged is sanctioned by the Silverman case. 9 2
The administrator has no right to renew under any circumstances. He
has been purposely left out of the present statute although he had been in-
cluded in prior statutes.93
V. PROPRIETOR'S RIGHTS
In addition to providing a renewal term for the author and his family, the
statute also enumerates certain cases where others may be similarly entitled.
We have seen that in the ordinary case where an author composes a work
on his own behalf, he alone and his family are entitled to the renewal even
though not originally copyrighted by him. The statute does not make spe-
cific provision for a proprietor or assignee to make the renewal application
except in the following instances:
1) In the case of a posthumous work, or a periodical, cyclopedic, or other
composite work upon which the copyright was originally secured by the
proprietor thereof ;
90In Stuff v. LaBudde Feed and Grain Co., 52 U. S. P. Q. 23 (E. D. Wis. 1941),
the court indicates that a legatee may not be entitled to apply for renewal.91There is little authority on this point. WEL, op. cit. supra note 67, at 365, observes
that a testamentary disposition in favor of a publisher would not be enforceable against
the next of kin. SHarSTER, op. cit. supra note 60, at 173, thinks that the author's bequest
of the renewal right is invalid if he dies prior to the accrual of the renewal period.
On the other hand, DEWoLF, op. cit. supra note 76, at 68, indicates his belief that the
author may 'bequeath by will. See also Note (1941) 15 So. CALrF. L. REv. 108. It
would seem that the reason for the hesitancy to permit the author to bequeath the
renewal right is based on a desire to prevent a bequest in favor of the publisher and
also because the legatee could not renew in his own name, though he would be entitled
to the beneficial interest.92See also Fitch v. Schubert, 20 F. Supp. 314 (S. D. N. Y. 1937).
93H. R. REP. No. 2220, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. (1908) ; Danks v. Gordon, 272 Fed. 821
(C. C. A. 2d,.1921).
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2) In the case of any work originally copyrighted by a corporate body,
provided it did not obtain the original copyright as assignee or licensee of
an individual author;
3) In the case of any work copyrighted by an employer for whom such
work was made for hire.
In either of these three cases the "proprietor of such copyright shall be
entitled to a renewal. '9
4
The case of a work copyrighted by an employer where the work was made
for hire, has received the most frequent interpretation and has been produc-
tive of some interesting results.
In Tobani v. Fischer,95 Tobani, a composer and arranger was employed by
the defendant. When the first term of the copyright obtained for Tobani's
work had expired, the composer's children, Tobani having died, renewed in
their own names. They sought in this action to restrain the former employer
from continuing to publish the copyrighted work. In refusing to enjoin the
defendant, the court held that defendant was the author of the work as
defined in Section 62 of the Copyright Act, the word "author" including an
employer in case of a work made for hire.96 The court, however, denied the
defendant's counterclaim for an assignment of the renewal term thus obtained
because defendant alone having been entitled to apply for the renewal copy-
right, the renewal by Tobani's children was void and they had nothing to
assign. The defendant, having failed to renew within the time limited, the
work passed into the public domain.
The Tobani case was decided under Section 24 of the Act relating to sub-
sisting copyrights since the works involved were copyrighted prior to 1909.
The Act makes an apparently unintentional distinction between new and
subsisting works because it omits the rights granted to the proprietors in
Section 23, excepting in case of a composite work, though it includes the
author's family proviso of Section 23.
It was not until the case of Shapiro, Bernstein and Co. v. Bryan97 that the
"employer in case of work made for hire" clause and the term "proprietor"
as used in Section 23 received interpretation. In that case Bryan and Fisher
wrote "Come Josephine in My Flying Machine" while employed by Shapiro.
94Copyright Act of 1909, § 23, supra note 2.
9598 F. (2d) 57 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).961n the Yardley case, where the artist painted a picture for the Board of Education,
the circuit court passed over the district courts' suggestion that the artist had no right
to the original copyright, because it was a work made for hire, and went on to make
some unnecessary, and, it is submitted, incorrect holdings heretofore discussed (supra
note 86) ; Yale University Press v. Row, Peterson & Co., 40 F. (2d) 290 (S. D. N. Y.
1930) ; National Cloak and Suit Co. v. Kaufman, 189 Fed. 215 (C. C. M. D. Pa. 1911).
97123 F. (2d) 697 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941).
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The song was copyrighted by Shapiro in 1910. After Shapiro's death in
1911, his widow assigned the copyright to plaintiff who renewed in 1937 as
"proprietor of a work 'made for hire." In a suit for infringement against
the author who had also renewed, the court held that the plaintiff as pro-
prietor of the copyright at the time of the renewal was entitled thereto within
the meaning of the statute.9s
Thus we have a different rule for proprietors than we have for authors.
In the former case, the employer can assign the right to apply for renewal
and the assignee's right is not dependent on the assignor's surviving the
first term. Nor is there any limitation on those who are to take on the
employer's death. This is in line with the policy of the Act to protect the
author only, as used in its colloquial sense. The Act seeks also to secure the
author's family. There is no such interest in case of an employer.
A curious possibility apparently overlooked in the Tobani case would
occur if the employer-author, in case of a work subsisting before the passage
of the Act, died before the renewal right accrued. Section 24 which deals
with copyright in subsisting works does not contain an 'mployer-proprietor
clause such as is found in Section 23 and therefore under Section 24 the
employer's only claim is as an author under the definition of Section 62.99
And as such he is limited in his control and disposition of the renewal term
in the same manner as any other author. However, this point is purely
academic since there are no copyrights outstanding today which subsisted in
1909, unless they are already in their renewal terms.
VI. JOINT RIGHTS
Recent cases have presented some unusual patterns to confuse the courts
and suggest others that the authorities might have to grapple with in the
near future.
It is unquestioned law that where two parties jointly create or compose
they are equally entitled to the copyright secured for their joint effort, in
the absence of a contrary intent.'00
Where there are several entitled to the renewal term, such as the next of
kin, they take as tenants in common, the renewal by one inuring to the benefit
of all. 10 '
9sSee also Vitaphone Corp. v. Hutchinson Amusement Co., 28 F. Supp. 526 (C. C.
D. Mass. 1939).
99WEiL, op. cit. mcpra note 67, at 372.
'
0OPowell v. Head, 12 Ch. D. 686 (1879) ; Levy v. Rutley, L. R., 6 C. P. 523 (1871);
Maurel v. Smith, 220 Fed. 195 (S. D. N. Y. 1915); So. Music Pub. Co. v. Bibo-Lang,
10 F. Supp. 972 (S. D. N. Y. 1935) (joint author entitled to register renewal).
'
0oSilverman v. Sunrise Pictures Corp., 290 Fed. 804 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923), 273 Fed.
909 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921). AmnuD, op. cit. supra note 76, at 552; DEWoLF, op. Cit. supra
note 76, at 68 (children take as tenants in common).
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The situations that might arise through a combination of these two prin-
ciples can be recited ad infinitun. Cases involving musical copyright are
probably the greatest problem in this regard because of the manner in which
music is written. In the usual case, the lyrics are written by one person, and
the music composed by another or perhaps two others.
The case of Marks Mu sic Corp. v. Vogel Music Corp. et al. 10 2 is repre-
sentative of the type of situations that might arise for adjudication in various
patterns. Actually there are three cases between the same parties dealt with
in the opinion.
In the first case, one Howard wrote the music and Hough and Adams
the lyrics for a musical show. Among the songs written was one entitled,
"I Wonder Who's Kissing Her Now." The song was written in the fol-
lowing manner. Howard would write the music and he would send it to
the producer who in turn would send it to Hough and Adams for the lyrics.
Howard assigned to the plaintiff all his rights in the song, specifically in-
cluding the renewal rights. Pursuant to the assignment, Howard conveyed
the renewal term to the plaintiff after applying for and obtaining it. Hough
and Adams also renewed and assigned to the defendant. In this suit by
plaintiff to restrain the defendant from publishing the song, plaintiff relies
on the renewal being a new right and admits defendant's ownership of the
title and lyrics, but denies its right to the music. The court properly found
that the work was created as part of a common design, the parties intending
the combination of the words and music, and that the renewal was of the
entire work and that therefore the parties were tenants in common of the
entire song for the renewal term.
In the second case, Stein, a publisher, copyrighted a song, "The Bird in
Nellie's Hat," by virtue of assignments from Lamb, the lyricist, and Solman,
the composer. Thereafter, Lamb and Solman made a separate assignment of
their rights in the renewal terms (as yet unaccrued) to Stein. The plaintiff
succeeded to Stein's business and Solman obtained the renewal term and
executed a conveyance thereof to it. The defendant claims a right in this
song by virtue of an assignment from Lamb's brother who as his next of kin
(there being no widow or children) was entitled to the renewal term, Lamb
having died prior to the last year of the first term. Plaintiff contended
(among other things) that since the brother did not apply for the renewal
term his right lapsed and his interest passed into the public domain. In
denying plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, the court at least recog-
nized that there might be some merit in defendant's case. It would seem
inequitable, however, under these particular facts to permit Lamb's brother,
10242 F. Supp. 859 (S. D. N. Y. 1942).
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and therefore his assignee, to have the advantage of Solman's renewal when
in fact Lamb had ceased being a joint owner by virtue of his assignment to
Stein. Since the brother's claim is dependent wholly on the. statute, and
he is required to make an application for the renewal term in order to be
beneficially entitled thereto, he should be held to the letter of it, especially
where to permit a deviation will work an inequitable result.
In the last case, one Marks wrote lyrics and sent them to a publisher who
obtained music from one Loraine. The song, "December in May," was
copyrighted by the publisher and renewed by Marks. Loraine never re-
newed but assigned all his interest in the song to the defendant subsequent
to the expiration of the renewal period. Defendant claims an interest in
the song as tenant in common contending that Marks's renewal inured to
Loraine's benefit. The plaintiff argued that Marks renewed for the lyrics
only, and that the music not having been renewed passed into the public
domain. The court found, as it did in the first case, that the song was written
as part of a common design. In an able discussion of joint authorship the
court concluded that physical propinquity of the authors and consultations
are not essential to the creation of a joint work. The only requirement, as
Judge Learned Hand ptits it in Maurel v. Sinith,10 3 is that the collaborators
knowingly engage in the production of a piece which is to be presented
originally as a whole only. The original unity of words and music in the
copyrighted song was not dissolved by the application for renewal which
in its terms was of a musical composition. And Marks's renewal inured to
the benefit of both himself and Loraine.104
In Harris v. Coca-Cola Co.,10 the circuit court reversed the district court
and held that the renewal copyright of a book did not cover the illustrations
contained therein which had been contributed by another artist. This case
decided in 1934 would seem to be in conflict with principles enunciated above
and probably would not be followed. Whether a renewal copyright may be
obtained for a part of a work produced under a common design and copy-
righted as a joint work would seem to be an open question. No doubt the
application of equitable principles will determine this issue.
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Out of this maze of case and text authority, certain well defined legal
principles are rapidly forming. Although, as has been seen one cannot be
too sure of the ultimate solution of the many problems involved in the deter-
103220 Fed. 195, 200 (S. D. N. Y. 1915).
104See note 101 supra.
10573 F. (2d) 370 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934), rev'g 1 F. Supp. 713 (N. D. Ga. 1932).
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mination of renewal rights, the trend of judicial opinion indicates the fol-
lowing conclusions:
1. An ordinary assignment of the copyright in a particular work car-
ries no right, legal or equitable, to the renewal term.
2. Where the renewal term is specifically assigned, or the intention
that the assignee is to have the renewal term sufficiently indicated,
the courts will impose a trust on the author in favor of the assignee
should he apply for and obtain the renewal; and they will require
a conveyance by the author to the assignee of the renewal term.
3. The assignee may never renew in his own name, although if he
obtains a power of attorney from the author he may secure the
renewal in the author's name and make a conveyance to himself,
PROVIDED, the author survives the twenty-seventh year of the
first term and is alive when the application is made. In the absence
of such a power of attorney, a court of equity may require the
author to renew and make a conveyance to the assignee.
4. If the author dies prior to the accrual of the renewal period the
assignee of the renewal term will not be entitled thereto.
5. It is submitted that even though an author who has assigned his
renewal term lives beyond the twenty-seventh year of the first term,
if he dies prior to the making of the application for the renewal
copyright, the assignee will not be entitled thereto if thereafter
acquired by the author's widow, children, etc.
6. On application for specific enforcement of the assignment contract,
the court may refuse to enforce the contract if it finds any over-
reaching on the part of the assignee or deems the consideration in-
adequate in view of the unequal bargaining power of the parties.
7. The author may bequeath the renewal right by will, though it will
be ineffective if he is survived by a widow or children who are
alive at the time of the accrual of the renewal period. It is sub-
mitted that such disposition *by will is effective even if made prior
to the accrual of the renewal period, though subject to the rights of
the widow and children.
8. It is submitted that the legatees may renew whether or not there is
an executor.
9. The executor may renew in the absence of a widow or children, and
even though the author died prior to the accrual of the renewal
period. The executor holds the renewal term for the benefit of the
legatees or next of kin.
10. It is submitted that the next of kin may renew, where they are bene-
ficially entitled to the renewal term, even though there is an execu-
tor where the latter refuses to or fails to make prompt application
for the renewal teim.
11. The beneficiaries enumerated in the statute may assign away their
interest in the renewal term in the same manner as the author, sub-
ject to similar restrictions, conditions, and limitations.
12. The proprietor of the copyright of a work made for hire is one
who owns such a work when the renewal right accrues. He may
1943]
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renew in his own name, and in the event of his death prior to such
accrual, his legal heirs succeed to his rights in the renewal term.
13. Where a work was originally copyrighted by a corporation other-
wise than as assignee of an individual author, or in the case of any
posthumous, periodical, cyclopedic, or other composite work origi-
nally copyrighted by a proprietor, any proprietor at the time of the
accrual of the renewal period may apply for and obtain the renewal.
14. Where a work is created through a common design of the con-
tributors, renewal by one co-author inures to the benefit of all,
and if any co-author be dead, to the benefit of those enumerated in
the statute.
15. A renewal of a work created by a common design is a renewal of
the entire work and not only of the part contributed by the person
renewing.
16. Where a work is created by several as co-authors, the beneficiaries
as named in the statute are entitled as tenants in common to the
renewal term with renewing co-authors or co-beneficiaries.
